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Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), also known as Payment for Environmental 
Services, has become an increasingly popular economic approach to address 
environmental problems. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), watershed is among the services that are currently receiving most 
funds and interest worldwide. The author compares two distinctive watershed PES 
programs, namely the New York City Watershed Program and Beijing Watershed 
Program in China, discusses their different levels of success due to approach towards 
the program, program framework and watershed economic gains and program 
management and operation, and put forward suggestions for program improvement for 
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Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), also known as Payment for Environmental 
Services, has become an increasingly popular economic approach to address 
environmental problems. In absence of an officially recognized definition, PES is 
generally understood as the payment made by the beneficiary of a particular ecosystem 
service to the service provider (Wang 2007). The variety of ecosystem services, which are 
“components of nature, directly enjoyed, consumed or used to yield human well-being” 
(Boyd and Banzhaf 2006), has enabled diversified PES programs targeting different 
ecological services. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), watersheds are among the services currently receiving the most funds and 
interest worldwide (2007). This author compares two distinctive watershed PES 
programs, namely the New York City Watershed Program and Beijing Watershed 
Program in China, and attempts to discuss their differential levels of success. 
 
1. Overview of New York City Watershed Program 
 
The New York City water supply system is comprised of 19 reservoirs and 3 
controlled lakes, which are located up to 125 miles from the city and are interconnected 
by a complex series of tunnels and aqueducts (New York City Environmental Protection 
Department 2012).  The System provides water services to 9 million people and comes 
mostly (90%) from the Catskill-Delaware watershed system west of the Hudson River 
(Appleton 2002). Since the 1980s, concern over the quality of unfiltered surface water 
from the Catskill-Delaware watersheds began to grow in response to the advent of more 
toxic land use and agricultural practices. In consultation with the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), New York City decided to avoid a filtration plant—estimated 
to cost between $4 billion and $6 billion for construction, and 250 million annually for 
operation and maintenance—and instead, opt for a comprehensive watershed protection 
program to meet federal and state water quality standards in a cost-effective manner 
(Appleton 2002). The comprehensive watershed protection program of New York City 
included a number of projects aiming at promoting sustainable farming practices and 
better forest management, and proved to be remarkably successful. As a result of this 
success, the EPA issued the first New York City Filtration Avoidance Determination in 
1997, which stated that the City would not be required to filter Catskill-Delaware public 
water if it complies with the filtration avoidance criteria and all conditions set in the 
Determination (EPA 1997). In 2007, EPA issued a second New York City Filtration 
Avoidance Determination recognizing that the City has an adequate long-term watershed 
protection program for Catskill-Delaware water supply and extending the program for 
another 10 years until 2017 (EPA 2007).  
 
After rounds of consultations among relevant stakeholders, such as environmental 
protection, agriculture, and forestry authorities, as well as the local communities in 
Catskill-Delaware watersheds, the non-profit Watershed Agricultural Council (WAC) was 
created in 1993. This organization oversees the continuously evolving voluntary 
incentive-based watershed protection programs. The main PES schemes administered by 
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WAC are: (1) Watershed Agricultural Program; (2) Watershed Forest Management Plan; 
and (3) Conservation Easement (WAC 2011).  
 
1.1 Watershed Agricultural Program (WAP) 
 
Landowners in the Catskill-Delaware watershed can sign up to the WAP and agree to 
follow the prescribed Whole Farm Plan (WFP) on a voluntary basis, Their farm 
operation will follow individualized state-of-art best management practices (BMPs) that 
benefit water quality and land conservation.  New York City will cover all the cost for 
infrastructure construction and follow-up technical assistance throughout the period of a 
WFP contract, which is normally 10 to 15 years (WAC 2012).  
 
1.2 Watershed Forest Management Plan (WFMP) 
 
Owners of over 10 acres of forest in the watersheds can be voluntarily enrolled in 
WFMP, which provides technical assistance from certified foresters regarding better 
forest management (WAC 2012). The forest owners would have the technical capacity to 
reduce pesticide use and hence mitigate water contamination risks. Healthy forests also 
serve as natural purifiers for rainwater, which will be then stored in aquifers. Technical 
assistance can be costly and the support from WAC makes it much more viable 
economically for land owners to seek for such help. 
 
1.3 Conservation Easement 
 
WAC’s Conservation Easement program was initially prescribed in the New York 
City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement as part of the Land Acquisition Program 
(New York City 1997). In practice, conservation easements are normally sold by a 
landowner to the City at a fair price suggested by a certified appraiser and constitute a 
legally binding agreement that may limit or condition certain types of uses or activities 
from occurring on a property or prevent development from taking place on a property in 
order to fulfill the conservation purposes of the easement. Conservation easements 
function as non-possessory, legal covenants on a property. As such, landowners still 
possess the property and may sell or transfer a property encumbered by an easement. 
Only those who own a land larger than 50 acres in size and have an active and current 
Whole Farm Plan (WFP) are eligible for Conservation Easement program (WAC 2012), 





2. Overview of Beijing Watershed Program 
Consilience                                Lin: Payment for Watershed Services 
 
China is a water stressed country with per capita water resources less than a third of 
the world average (FAO 2003). For the national capital city Beijing, the situation is even 
worse. The population in Beijing reached 19.61 million in 2010, while the per capita 
water resources was merely 107 cubic meters, or 1/20 of national average (Beijing 
Municipal Government 2011) (United Nations 2011). In addition to severe water 
shortage, the city’s water challenge is futher complicated by water pollution. In 2010, 
only 54.4% of monitored surface water in Beijing met national and municipal water 
quality standards (Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau 2011). To ensure sufficient 
quantity and safe quality of water supply, Beijing has historically used 
command-and-control policies. Since the 1990s, Beijing has also tried PES schemes to 
help protect the Chao-Bai watersheds in neighboring Zhangjiakou and Chengde 
Municipalities of Hebei Province that feeds the Miyun Reservoir in Beijing, which 
provides 60% of the city’s tap water (Liao and Li 2003). The following are examples of 
these schemes. 
 
2.1  Beijing-Chengde Water Resource Protection Program 
 
In 1995, a working group on water resource protection between the governments of 
Beijing and Chengde municipality was established. The working group oversaw a water 
resource protection program under which Beijing municipal government provided 2.08 
million RMB annually to Chengde between 1995 and 2002. The fund was dedicated to 
water protection projects in Chengde watershed (Zheng 2010).  
 
2.2  Beijing-Chengde/Zhangjiakou Water Protection Program 
 
In 2005, Beijing agreed to provide 20 million RMB each year for a five-year period 
until 2009 to Chengde and Zhangjiakou municipalities. According to the Utilization 
Guidelines of Water Resource Protection and Environmental Treatment Fund between 
Beijing and Surrounding Areas, the fund was to ensure water quality and quantity of 
Miyun Reservoir through energy saving technology promotion, water quality monitoring, 
water pollution treatment and soil erosion abatement projects in Chengde and 
Zhangjiakou Watersheds (Beijing Municipal Government 2005). In the end of 2008, the 
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2.3  “Paddy to Dryland” Program 
 
In October 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the 
Beijing municipal government and Hebei provincial government to promote economic 
and social cooperation between the two neighbors. As part of the MOU, Chengde and 
Zhangjiakou municipalities of Hebei Province would carry out “paddy to dryland” 
programs, converting a total of 183,000 mu (30,134 acres) of water-intensive rice paddies 
to dryland suitable for less water-demanding crops. Recognizing the income loss may 
incur on the farmers, Beijing would subsidize the farmers for each mu of rice paddy 
converted at the rate of 450 RMB (Beijing Municipal Government 2006). The “income 
loss” subsidy was raised in 2008 to 550 RMB/mu (3,339 RMB or roughly 520 U.S. 
dollars/acre). Between 2008 and 2011, an annual subsidy of 39.05 million RMB were 
provided by Beijing municipal government. The program was extended in 2012 and the 
subsidy rate remained the same (Hebei Provincial Government 2012).  
 
2.4  Forest Management Program 
 
To review the progress under the MOU, the mayor of Beijing and the Governor of 
Hebei met in 2008 and agreed to carry out cooperation on forest management to better 
protect the watersheds of Chengde and Zhangjiekou municipalities. For the period 
2009-2011, Beijing would provide 100 million RMB to create 200,000 mu (32,933 acres) 
of “water conservation forests” in the watersheds. An additional 50 million RMB was 
committed by Beijing for fire prevention and pest control projects in the watershed 
forests (Zheng 2010).  
 
3. Comparison of New York City and Beijing Watershed 
Programs 
 
The two payment programs for watershed services in New York City and Beijing 
differ in terms of how the program was approached, structured and implemented. The 
reason for varied level of success may be deeply rooted in the political, institutional and 
legal differences of the two countries.  
 
3.1  Approach Towards the Program 
 
In developing the Catskill-Delaware watersheds PES program,, the authorities of 
New York City took a bottom-up approach. Policy makers in the New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection (NYCDEP) had rounds of face-to-face 
discussions and consultations with residents of the watersheds, a process that helped 
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build understanding and trust between the beneficiaries of the watershed services, namely 
9 million people in New York City represented by the NYCDEP, and the service 
providers, namely the landowners in the watersheds who commit to BMPs that protect 
the watersheds (Appleton 2002). This participation of all the stakeholders in the 
watersheds during the design and decision making phases is essential to ensure their 
active future participation in the payment scheme. In contrast, in the case of Chao-Bai 
watersheds program, the governments of Beijing and Hebei Province played a dominant 
role in developing the scheme, setting the subsidy standard, and implementing the 
program. That was a top-down approach with no evidence that farmers and residents in 
Chao-Bai watersheds were consulted for the development of the payment scheme.  
 
The bottom up approach of the Catskill-Delaware PES scheme is a typical 
decentralized approach, where the individuals involved in the environmental problem 
work out the solution themselves. The advantage of a decentralized approach is that the 
stakeholders have a strong incentive to put forward a solution; because they are the ones 
with the best knowledge of damage and abatement costs, they may be able to find the 
most efficient solutions (Field and Field 2009). In contrast, the case of Chao-Bai PES 
scheme was a centralized policy where a control administrative agency determined the 
types of projects and standard of subsidy to be carried out. As a result of the knowledge 
limitations of the policy makers, it would be extremely difficult for them alone to identify 
an efficient level of payment. The figures of millions committed by Beijing municipal 
government to Chengde and Zhangjiakou municipalities in the water protection and 
forest management programs appeared arbitrary, if not random, and thus may not be 
effective.  
 
3.2  Program Framework and Watershed Economic Gains  
 
The 1997 and 2007 EPA Filtration Avoidance Determinations and the 1997 New 
York City Watershed Memorandum of Agreement laid a consolidated framework for the 
PES schemes in Catskill-Delaware watersheds. Under the purview of these umbrella 
documents, separate agreements and contracts were negotiated and signed to help 
institutionalize the scheme. The tools of Watershed Agricultural Program (WAP), 
Watershed Forest Management Plan (WFMP) and Conservation Easement are all 
incentive-based. As such, the participants can receive tangible benefits in the form of 
direct income, subsidies, cost sharing or technical assistance. These strong incentives 
have helped promote active participation by the local community and effective watershed 
protection practice. By March 2011, 254 large farm operations in the Catskill-Delaware 
watersheds had signed up for the WAP, representing 96% of identified large farms, and 
90% of all large farms had achieved “substantial implementation” of the practices called 
for in their Whole Farm Plans (WFP). In terms of land acquisition, since 1997, the City’s 
ownership interest in watershed real property has increased by 321% as a result of 
conservation easement program (Holloway and Rush 2011). During the one-year period 
between July 1, 2010 and June 30, 2011, about $15.7 million were spent on WAP, WFMP 
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and Conservation Easement. Of that, over $6.6 million went to payment for 
conservation easement alone, and this part was translated as direct income for farm 
owners who participated in this scheme (WAC 2011).  
 
In contrast, the Chao-Bai watersheds program consisted of stand-alone schemes 
based on separate MOUs or arrangements that operated in different time periods. There 
was no single framework that provides a basis for long-term PES programs in the 
watersheds. At the same time, with the exception of “paddy to dryland” program where 
the farmers in the watersheds could be subsidized directly, all other schemes were based 
on government-led projects for constructing pollution treatment facilities, disseminating 
water saving technology, and reforestation efforts. The benefits of such projects were not 
always felt by the local farmers. In fact, the per capita GDP of the concerned watershed 
regions was only a quarter of that in rural counties of Beijing (Beijing Academy of Social 
Sciences 2006). The ecological compensation made by Beijing so far does not make up 
for the economic sacrifice made by the upper watersheds in Hebei Province, and the 
watershed areas had deteriorated into a “belt of poverty” around Beijing (Xiao Jincheng, 
Li, and Qi 2012) (Asian Development Bank 2005).  
 
The Conservation Easement stands out as a unique component of the 
Catskill-Delaware watersheds program and nothing similar can be found in the Chao-Bai 
watersheds program. The legal basis for Conservation Easement is that the farmers have 
both property rights and operation rights over the farmland. In China however, socialist 
public ownership prevails and the country’s Land Management Law stipulates that urban 
lands are state owned, rural lands are collectively owned, and no individual may sell or 
transfer land property rights (2005). The farmlands in rural areas are leased to farmers on 
contracts with a normal term of 30 years in accordance with the Rural Land Contract 
Law (2002). Therefore the farmers in Chao-Bai watersheds own only operation rights for 
the period of their contracts, but not the property rights over their farmlands. While the 
Land Management Law does allow the state to acquire rural land for public welfare and 
compensate the contracted farmers (2005), which could serve as a legal basis for a similar 
conservation easement scheme, this would be politically inpalatable, as the farmers would 
lose their only operation rights over the farmlands and hence risk their basic livelihood.  
 
3.3  Program Management and Operation 
 
The Catskill-Delaware PES programs are administered by the non-profit Watershed 
Agricultural Council (WAC) in accordance with its contract with the NYCDEP, which 
provides more than 90% of funds for the programs (WAC 2011). WAC is overseen by a 
board of directors, who represent the interests of farm and forest owners in the 
watersheds. Among the 17 board members of 2012, 16 are current or retired farmers, 
forest landowners or relevant businessmen (WAC 2012). A single administering entity by 
the local community representatives ensured the smooth operation and wider 
participation of the PES programs. In the case of Chao-Bai watersheds program, a single 
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organization in charge of all programs was missing. Various government agencies, such 
as environmental protection, water resources, forestry and agricultural authorities 
oversaw and approved submitted project proposals according to their respective 
administrative mandates. The Chao-Bai program’s  time-consuming review and 
approval process, which involved multiple levels of government authorities constituted 




The Catskill-Delaware watersheds payment scheme represents a model PES program, 
while the Chao-Bai watersheds program represents room for improvement. 
 
4.1  Insufficient Funding 
 
There has been a general understanding that the funds currently “compensated” for 
Chao-Bai watersheds by Beijing are not sufficient to reflect the full value of the 
ecosystem. Some scholars estimated the ecological value of Miyun Reservoir as over 47 
billion RMB (Hu et al. 2007). The compensation funds, both indirect payment in the 
form of public projects and direct payment in the form of monetary subsidies, shall be 
substantially increased to better protect the watersheds and help alleviate the degrading 
“belt of poverty”. Unlike the Catskill-Delaware watersheds where water quantity is not a 
main issue, Chao-Bai watersheds face challenges in both water quantity and quality. 
Indirect and direct funds play different roles in ensuring water quantity and quality and 
are hence both indispensable. For example, indirect funds in the form of public projects 
work better in treating point industrial pollution and protecting water quality, and direct 
funds such as “paddy to dryland” subsidies work well in ensuring water quantity. 
 
4.2  Source of Funding 
 
For indirect compensation in the form of public projects, the Beijing municipal 
government should be able to appropriate a larger portion of its continuously growing 
budget and support water pollution treatment and forest management projects in the 
watersheds. As for funding direct subsidies, water price adjustment could be a possible 
solution. Currently, water in urban Beijing is seriously underpriced. Compared to 
water-abundant Philadelphia, where water is priced at about 1.2 cents/gallon 
(Philadelphia Water Department 2011), the price in Beijing is 4 RMB/ton, or 0.25 
cents/gallon (Beijing Water Authority 2012), a mere 1/5 that of Philadelphia. Taking into 
account the water scarcity in Beijing, it is justifiable to raise the water price so that the 
downstream users can pay a fairer price for the water resources from upstream 
watersheds. As there are about 20 million residents in Beijing paying water bills, even a 
slight increase in water price accumulates to considerable funds.  




4.3  Fund Management 
 
While a national PES law remains missing in China, the existing MOU on economic 
and social cooperation signed between Beijing and Hebei is an acceptable basis upon 
which a separate long-term framework agreement dedicated to PES schemes between 
Beijing and Chao-Bai watersheds can be developed. Under this framework agreement, 
the type and rate of PES measures could be specified. For indirect compensation in the 
forms of public projects, relevant government agencies shall remain responsible for 
implementation. For subsidy funds, collected from higher water prices for example, a 
NGO could be set up for its management. This NGO shall reach out to the farmers to 
understand their practical needs and help develop subsidy rates at a more efficient level. 
The organization shall also be responsible for direct reimbursements to the farmers 
according to the agreed rate to minimize transaction costs. In addition, a farm 
management plan similar to the Whole Farm Plan (WFP) used in the Catskill-Delaware 
watersheds can be developed for the Chao-Bai watersheds with the full support from the 
subsidy funds. In addition to the “paddy to dryland” program, which mainly targets 
water quantity assurance, this farm management plan can encourage the farmers to 
employ individualized best management practices (BMPs) to reduce non-point pollution 
from farmlands and better protect water quality.  
 
4.4  Positive verses Negative Incentives 
 
In both Catskill-Delaware and Chao-Bai programs, positive incentives (ie financial 
rewards for better practices), are adopted rather than negative incentives (ie penalties for 
non-compliance). In almost all countries, non-point pollution in rural areas, mainly 
caused by fertilizer and pesticide overuse and animal waste, is a problem more 
challenging for regulators than point pollution from industrial sources. Industrial 
pollution can be easily monitored at the chimney or wastewater discharge point and once 
non-compliance is detected, the polluting factory is undeniably responsible. In the case 
of farmers, however, the source is less obvious—when pollution is detected in a river, it 
is not possible to be sure which farmers are responsible and how much each of them 
contributed. Meanwhile, financial rewards are far more politically palatable than penalties. 
Therefore, for many watershed PES schemes, positive incentives may prove more 
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5. Recommendations 
 
This paper only discusses two cases of watershed PES programs, but some lessons 
can be drawn from the comparison and be potentially applied to other localities where a 
watershed PES program is being considered. First, a well thought out funding scheme is 
of integral importance. In many cases, the government is the only funding source. It may 
be applicable in some countries where the government enjoys steady and sufficient 
revenue, but in others where the government struggles to support important public 
programs, innovative approaches, including Public Private Partnership (PPP), could be 
explored to tap private capital. Second, the improvement of ecological services will take 
years, therefore any PES schemes must be long-term so ensure tangible outcome. In this 
regard, political support will be essential. The government should lead the efforts in 
developing a long-term framework under which PES schemes can be implemented. 
Third, without active engagement of local stakeholders (ie farmers who live in the 
watershed), no PES programs can be truly successfully implemented. Local stakeholders 
should be engaged in the whole process, from the program design to the implementation, 
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